Judicial reform: the STF as a Constitutional Court
Proposes ending the STF's original criminal jurisdiction, limits on single-justice rulings, a cooling-off period before ministers of state can be nominated to the court, and changes to the CNJ and the CNMP.
What the program says
The Supreme Federal Court (STF) has accumulated, over the years, a volume of functions that has no parallel among the Constitutional Courts of other nations. This accumulation generates legal uncertainty, democratic instability and an imbalance between the will of the representatives elected by the people and the review of that will, often anchored in subjective interpretations of the Constitution. Returning the Supreme Court to its role as a Constitutional Court means restoring the balance between the Branches, which is the foundation of democracy. We propose: • An end to the STF’s original criminal jurisdiction, allowing lawmakers to be tried by lower courts, such as the STJ (Superior Court of Justice) or the TRFs (Federal Regional Courts), so that they can exercise their mandates with greater dignity, without this representing any impunity in return. • Limits on the STF’s single-justice rulings, favoring collegial decisions and presuming the constitutionality of the legislative process, so that the pen of a single justice does not override the work of the entire Congress. • A review of the scope of ADPFs and of the parties with standing to file ADPFs, ADIs and ADCs (types of constitutional actions). • A 1-year cooling-off period before Ministers of State can be nominated to the STF. [p. 65]
• A bar on relatives up to the third degree, and their respective law firms, from practicing in the court of the judge they are related to. • Broader participation of civil society in the CNJ (National Council of Justice) and the CNMP (National Council of the Prosecution Service), and a redefinition of their powers to limit their activity of a legislative nature. None of these measures weakens the Judiciary. All of them return it to its constitutional place, and return to the people, through their elected representatives, the power to decide about their own lives. [p. 66]
In plain language
- The program proposes returning the STF to the role of a Constitutional Court. To that end, it provides for ending the court’s original criminal jurisdiction, allowing lawmakers to be tried by lower courts, such as the STJ or the TRFs.
- It provides for limiting the STF’s single-justice rulings and giving preference to collegial decisions. It also proposes presuming the constitutionality of the legislative process, so that the decision of a single justice does not override the work of Congress.
- It proposes reviewing the scope of ADPFs and the list of who can file ADPFs, ADIs and ADCs.
- It provides for a 1-year cooling-off period before a minister of state can be nominated to the STF. It also proposes barring a judge’s relatives up to the third degree, and their respective law firm, from practicing in that judge’s court.
- It proposes broadening civil-society participation in the CNJ and the CNMP and redefining these bodies’ powers to limit their activity of a legislative nature.
What is not in the program
- It does not name the legal instrument — a law, a constitutional amendment bill (PEC) or other — nor a timeline for any of the measures.
- It does not define which court would try each case after the end of original criminal jurisdiction; the STJ and the TRFs appear only as examples.
- It does not detail what limits would be placed on single-justice rulings.
- It does not specify how the scope of ADPFs would change nor who would gain, or lose, the ability to file ADPFs, ADIs and ADCs.
- It does not explain how civil-society participation in the CNJ and the CNMP would be broadened nor which of these bodies’ powers would be redefined.